COMMENT

OUR ANTITOTALITARIAN CONSTITUTION
AND THE RIGHT TO IDENTITY

BRIAN T. RUOCCO†
Underlying the United States Constitution is an antitotalitarian principle—i.e., the
government cannot define, regulate, or compel aspects of life that are fundamental to
identity and personhood. Prohibitions of compulsory childbirth, flag salutes, ideological
education, and racial separation most clearly evince this bulwark against totalitarianism.
Nonetheless, from birth, the government enforces legal gender, restricts the
availability of legal gender reclassification, and prevents individuals from removing
themselves from the legal gender system. The government thus affirmatively produces
and compels identity on an individual level. Moreover, for trans* people, these laws
cause expressive and dignitary harm, increase exposure to violence, and diminish life
opportunities. Although these gender identity laws constitute a totalitarian occupation
of individual lives, they have evaded constitutional scrutiny.
This Comment (1) evaluates the right to identity situated in the midst of the
Constitution’s proscription of totalitarianism and (2) investigates constitutional
arguments supporting trans* people’s right to self-determine their gender identity.
Specifically, this context illuminates the right to identity and how the government
engages in compulsory, affirmative identity formation. Ultimately, this Comment
demonstrates that for trans* people and our Constitution alike, we must eliminate
totalitarian gender identity laws and totalitarianism in all forms.
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INTRODUCTION
Our Constitution proscribes totalitarian government. Under the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, the United States government cannot define,
regulate, or compel aspects of life that are fundamental to identity and
personhood. It cannot occupy our lives or enforce conformity and subservience
to the State in the way a totalitarian government would.
Certain freedoms serve as a bulwark against government-compelled identity
and conformity. Those freedoms protect us from government attempts to
submerge the individual beneath the State. For example, the government cannot
force women to bear children and take on motherhood,1 compel children to salute

1 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”);
see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 782, 788-90 (1989) (suggesting
that women may abort their pregnancies “so that they may avoid being forced into an identity” and
explaining that anti-abortion laws impermissibly “exert power productively over a woman’s body and . . .
forcefully reshape and redirect her life”).
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the flag,2 or compel veterans to swear allegiance to the government.3 It cannot
prevent adults from marrying individuals of the opposite race or same gender.4
The seminal 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska evinces this proscription against
totalitarianism. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty, the
Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of
modern languages like German, French, Spanish, and Italian in schools prior
to the completion of eighth grade,5 even though the Fourteenth Amendment
does not address a right to language or schooling.6 Rather, the dispositive
liberty interest in Meyer was freedom from totalitarian government. While
“Sparta assembled the males at [age] seven into barracks and intrusted their
subsequent education and training to official guardians” to “submerge the
individual and develop ideal citizens,” and Plato envisioned the State
communally raising the children of the guardians, our Constitution would not
allow such institutions.7 As Justice McReynolds wrote,
Although [the] measures [of Sparta and Plato] have been deliberately
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between
individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could
impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence
to both [the] letter and spirit of the Constitution.8

The Meyer Court did not focus on what the Nebraska law prohibited.
Rather, the Court focused on the law’s affirmative work—its attempt to
produce and compel uniformity of thought and identity. Thus, to determine
whether governmental action violates the Constitution’s proscription against
totalitarianism, courts must evaluate not “what is being prohibited, but what is

2 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compulsory
flag salutes “transcend[] constitutional limitations on [government] power and invade[] the sphere
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control”).
3 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514-15, 529 (1958) (barring the government from
conditioning veterans’ tax exemptions on swearing allegiance to the United States).
4 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Under the Constitution, same-sex
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage
their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that the freedom of choice to marry
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations” and that “[u]nder our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State”).
5 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 403 (1923).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (neglecting to provide an explicit right to schooling, an
explicit right to learn a particular language, and an explicit right to preserve one’s native language).
7 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
8 Id. at 402.
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being produced” and “the real effects that conformity with the law produces at
the level of everyday lives and social practices.”9 The proscription against
totalitarianism prohibits restrictions on liberty that produce conformity with
respect to individual lives. Essentially, any law that produces a relation
between the individual and the State that evinces impermissible government
control over individuals is totalitarian and does violence to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
The proscription against totalitarianism prohibits government occupation
of individual lives. It does not, of course, bar all government restrictions on
liberty. The government may forbid or circumscribe some acts and liberties,
such as murder or drug use.10 The antitotalitarian principle respects “the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.”11 Accordingly, even in an antitotalitarian regime, laws may interject
some norms and practices that affirmatively shape our lives and help sustain
order. There is not an unlimited, unburdened right to define oneself. Rather,
the antitotalitarian principle “prevent[s] the state from taking over, or taking
undue advantage of, those processes by which individuals are defined.”12
One way the government affirmatively produces identity and conformity
is by documenting and enforcing legal gender. When a baby is born, the baby
is assigned “male” or “female” identity based on genital appearance. This
“male” or “female” identity is recorded on a birth certificate, becomes the
baby’s legal gender, and helps structure the individual’s life. This identity
affects how the individual navigates sex-segregated facilities, legal documentation,
gendered expectations, and interactions with state and nonstate entities.13
For most people, this assigned legal gender will raise little to no concern
because most people identify with their assigned legal gender. Nevertheless,
“[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is
a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”14 In the context

9 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783.
10 Cf. id. at 784 (differentiating laws that “take over the lives of the persons involved” from those

that remove a single act or liberty).
11 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 794.
13 See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 737, 752-53 (2008) (describing
how legal gender affects trans* people’s interactions with sex-segregated facilities like homeless
shelters and increases their exposure to discrimination in contexts where one must present
identification, such as interactions with police or during the employment application process).
14 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992); see also id. (stating that
although legislation requiring spousal notification before obtaining an abortion may only negatively
restrict one percent of women who obtain abortions, “[l]egislation is measured for consistency with
the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects”).
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of legal gender, trans*15 people are the ones who find themselves most
encumbered. Specifically, trans* people who do not identify with their legal
gender experience intense expressive and dignitary harm and are often
subjected to violence, harassment, and assault when they present incongruent
legal documents.16 For those who wish to reclassify their legal gender, a
complex legal matrix awaits.17 Therefore, trans* people are the proper focus
of the constitutional inquiry regarding legal gender identity.
The imposition of gender identity on trans* people inverts the typical
relationship between the individual and the State. Typically, the Constitution
allows individuals to self-regulate and self-govern regarding matters of
personhood and identity; the government restricts certain liberties to promote
ordered liberty and justice,18 but does not impose identity. Ultimately, the
Constitution proscribes the government’s totalitarian enforcement of gender
identity on trans* people. Therefore, for both trans* people and the Constitution,
we must eliminate these totalitarian gender identity laws.
Thus, this Comment seeks to (1) evaluate the constitutional right to
identity situated in the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism
and (2) investigate constitutional arguments for the right of trans* people to
self-determine their gender identity. This context illuminates the right to
identity and how the government engages in compulsory, affirmative
identity formation.
Part I of this Comment addresses (1) legal gender and how it is documented,
(2) how trans* people are (or are not) afforded the opportunity to self-define
their legal gender, and (3) how the government impermissibly appropriates
trans* people’s gender identities to buttress normative conceptions of sex and
gender. Part II analyzes the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism
and the constitutional right to identity in both substantive due process and
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III evaluates how trans* people can situate
gender identity claims within a constitutional framework of antitotalitarianism and

15 The term trans* (with an asterisk) refers to a diverse group of individuals who may identify as
transgender, genderqueer, genderfluid, nonbinary, genderf*ck, genderless, third gender, two-spirit,
bigender, or gender nonconforming. The use of trans* underscores that this analysis includes all individuals
who have a self-determined identity in conflict with the traditional, cisgendered male–female binary. See
Hugh Ryan, What Does Trans* Mean, and Where Did It Come From?, SLATE: OUTWARD (Jan. 10, 2014,
12:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/01/10/trans_what_does_it_mean_and_where_did_it
_come_from.html [https://perma.cc/BJL4-F2MT] (“[T]he * is used metaphorically to capture all the
identities—from drag queen to genderqueer—that fall outside traditional gender norms.”). When “trans,”
“transgender,” or another label is used in this Comment, it is generally due to a cited author’s use of the
term or an individual’s self-identification. This distinction is complicated by the fact that many authors use
a definition of “trans” or “transgender” that includes most trans* people.
16 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
18 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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the right to identity. Finally, Part IV evaluates how the government can eliminate
unconstitutional violations of trans* people’s rights.
I. TRANS* PEOPLE AND GENDER IDENTITY
A. Legal Gender and Legal Gender Documentation
Although legal gender is ubiquitous in the United States, people whose
gender identity matches their legal gender may be unaware of the insidious
ways that legal gender affects trans* people.19 Gender is at the core of identity
and helps shape interactions with the world.20 Considering the countless ways
in which names, pronouns, facilities, toys, and clothing are gendered, it is
impossible to navigate everyday interactions without regard for gender.
People interact with others on the basis of previously or contemporaneously
observed signifiers such as clothing, voice, body shape, hairstyle, makeup,
affectations, etc., that are inextricably tied to normative conceptions of
gender.21 Since people generally interact with men and women differently,22
these gender signals are often indispensable to normal social interactions.
Thus, trans* people frequently attempt to shape how others perceive them
(while also expressing their own self-conception) by presenting external
signals such as hairstyle and clothing. A minority of trans* people also
undergo surgeries to help them express their gender identity.23
But legal gender can vitiate the ability of trans* people to present their gender
and can be used to justify denying trans* people the right to self-identification.
The government imposes gender identity, thereby permitting others to assert
control over trans* people’s identities. This engenders expressive harm, causes

19 See Spade, supra note 13, at 734 (refuting the mistaken belief that trans people can easily
change their legal gender by simply presenting evidence to a government agency); cf. Peggy
McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences
Through Work in Women’s Studies 1, 4 (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper
No. 189, 1988) (viewing “white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets” that benefit
white people, often without their knowledge or awareness).
20 Cf. Peter Weinreich, The Operationalisation of Identity Theory in Racial and Ethnic Relations
(“[Identity is] the totality of one’s self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present
expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one
construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.”), in THEORIES OF RACE AND ETHNIC
RELATIONS 299, 317 (John Rex. & David Mason eds., 1986).
21 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1958)
(describing the ways in which an individual presents information about herself through visible or
observable “sign vehicles” and how others use this information to help shape their interactions with her).
22 As a basic example, people typically refer to others with gendered pronouns like “he” or “she.”
23 See Spade, supra note 13, at 754 (describing how trans people express gendered characteristics
through both noninvasive approaches and gender-confirming surgeries).
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dignitary harm, and enhances exposure to discrimination and assault.24 Legal
gender thus operates as a mechanism of control and oppression.
Consider the experience of Alexandra Glover, a twenty-one-year-old
transgender woman who went to the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles
(OMV) to update her driver’s license photo.25 She did not attempt to change
her legal gender, which, in Louisiana, requires proof of surgery.26 The OMV
employee looked at Alexandra, who identifies as a woman and presents as female,
and declared that Alexandra had to present herself as a man in her driver’s license
photo: “You can’t present as a woman if you’re listed as a man . . . . If you have
makeup on or anything like that you’re supposed to take all that off, because
you are actually a man.”27 At the time, Louisiana’s OMV photo policy stated,
“At no time will an applicant be photographed when it is obvious he/she is
misrepresenting his/her gender and/or purposely alternating his/her appearance
in an effort which would ‘misguide/misrepresent’ his/her identity.”28
By saying “you are actually a man,” the OMV employee used legal gender,
and the state’s photo policy, to assert a claim over Alexandra Glover’s gender.
Moreover, the State—through the employee—attempted to control Alexandra’s
gender presentation, including her use of makeup. The State compelled
Alexandra to present an outward identity in conformance with the government’s
normative conceptions of sex and gender. This was a totalitarian attempt to
appropriate a transgender woman’s body to buttress traditional gender norms.
To make matters worse, since trans* people disproportionately experience
homelessness, unemployment, and poverty,29 they are disproportionately
24 See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 152-55 (2011) (detailing how trans people with identity documents that do not
match their gender identity face an increased risk of discrimination, harassment, and assault).
25 See Maya Lau, Transgender Driver Told She Can’t ‘Misrepresent’ Self as a Woman in License Photo, Setting
Off Review of Louisiana Policy, ADVOCATE (Sept. 11, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://theadvocate.com/news/1340303
9-123/louisiana-office-of-motor-vehicles [https://perma.cc/D3NH-C4QX].
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Photographing Policy, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY:
OFFICE MOTOR VEHICLES, http://dpsweb.dps.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/58c968bd569b099986256cdc0
00806eb/d2c15655fbb79e72862564ae005331dc?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/2A92-PW9X] (last
updated March 12, 2009)). In response to negative public attention, the Office of Motor Vehicles
revised their photography policy to allow an individual to be photographed wearing makeup,
clothing, and accessories “not matching the traditional expectations of an applicant’s gender.”
Photographing an Applicant Policy, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: OFFICE MOTOR VEHICLES,
http://dpsweb.dps.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/58c968bd569b099986256cdc000806eb/d2c15655fbb79e72
862564ae005331dc?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/VK93-6DF6] (last updated Aug. 11, 2016).
29 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 2-4 (reporting that almost 20% of trans people have
experienced homelessness and that trans people are twice as likely as the general population to
experience unemployment and four times as likely to suffer extreme poverty—i.e., a household
income of less than $10,000 per year).
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subjected to government-supervised facilities. These facilities—including
foster homes, homeless shelters, jails, and prisons—segregate based on sex.
Therefore, trans* people are more likely to be in positions where legal gender,
and the concomitant government control, is imposed. For example, while
discontinuing her long-term estrogen treatment, a prison doctor told Ann
Sweeney, a trans woman who had been placed in a male prison facility, “You
were born a boy, and you’re going to stay a boy.”30 By enforcing legal gender,
the State—acting through the prison doctor—repudiated Ann Sweeney’s
female identity by calling her a “boy” who will always be a “boy” and placing
her in a male prison facility; moreover, the State vitiated her ability to present
her body as female by discontinuing her feminizing hormone treatments.
Thus, the State used Ann Sweeney’s legal gender to occupy and control her
identity and body.
B. Reclassifying One’s Gender
Trans* people are prohibited from opting out of the legal gender system.
They cannot remove gender markers from their documents or eliminate
government records of legal gender. Instead, legal gender is marked on
documents that are ubiquitous and necessary to engage in ordinary activities
like purchasing alcohol, applying for employment, or traveling. Trans* people
who attempt to reclassify their gender confront a “rule matrix [of] hundreds
of formal and informal policies at the federal, state, and local levels.”31
Gender reclassification schemes exist on a spectrum. Various entities and
government agencies have different rules regarding gender that determine
whether trans* people may reclassify and self-define their gender. On one end,
some entities accept trans* people’s gender identity based on self-identification
alone. For instance, as of late 2016, homeless shelters that receive federal funding
must allow trans* people to self-determine their gender and access sex-segregated
housing according to their gender identity.32 Likewise, Argentina and Ireland allow
people to change their legal gender based solely on self-identification;33 there is no
30 Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender
Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 500-01 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Spade, supra note 13, at 733.
32 Equal Access in Accordance with an Individual’s Gender Identity in Community Planning and
Development Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,763, 64,782 (Sept. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
33 See Gender Recognition Act 2015 (Act No. 25/2015) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/
2015/act/25/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/FW9W-9SAQ] (“A person who applies for a gender
recognition certificate . . . shall furnish . . . a statutory declaration declaring that he or she . . . has
a settled and solemn intention of living in the preferred gender for the rest of his or her life . . . .”);
Emily Schmall, Transgender Advocates Hail Law Easing Rules in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (May 24,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/americas/transgender-advocates-hail-argentina-la
w.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MKH4-QJGM] (“Argentina has put in place some of the most liberal
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need for psychiatric diagnosis, medical certification, or surgery. On the other end,
certain jurisdictions never allow gender reclassification. In Ohio and Tennessee, for
example, the legal gender printed on a birth certificate can never be changed.34
Many prisons similarly refuse to recognize a trans* person’s self-identification.35
Most jurisdictions in the United States have gender reclassification schemes
that fall in between the two ends of this spectrum. These jurisdictions require
various degrees of permission from the medical community or proof of surgery.
New York, for instance, will change legal gender on a driver’s license based on
a doctor’s letter certifying trans* identity.36 Until recently,37 New York City’s
birth certificate policy required a candidate for gender reclassification to
undergo either phalloplasty or vaginoplasty (i.e., creation of a penis or vagina,
respectively).38 Federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration
and the State Department, have their own gender reclassification schemes.39
This matrix often prevents trans* people from establishing a consistent
legal gender across overlapping jurisdictions.40 A trans* woman may be
rules on changing gender in the world, allowing people to alter their gender on official documents without
first having to receive a psychiatric diagnosis or surgery.”).
34 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2016) (“The sex of an individual shall not be changed
on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828,
831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (finding that a surgical gender transformation procedure was insufficient
to change petitioner’s sex from male to female under Ohio’s correction of birth record statute); see
also Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations
[https://perma.cc/7FSM-VCUP] (last updated Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Changing Birth Certificate Sex]
(noting that Tennessee and Ohio do not permit gender reclassification on birth certificates).
35 See Rosenblum, supra note 30, at 522-29 (noting that many prisons categorize trans* people
according to their genitalia, which results in harm and abuse to trans* people who have not yet
undergone genital surgery or do not wish to have this surgery).
36 See Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Driver License, Permit or Non-Driver ID Card, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/405/kw/gend
er/session/L3RpbWUvMTQ3MTIzMDgzMy9zaWQveUJsdFE1WW0%3D [https://perma.cc/M9
PG-F58R] (last updated Aug. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM) (“Proof of a sex change is a written statement from
a physician, a psychologist, or a psychiatrist that is printed on letterhead. The statement must certify
that one gender is your main gender . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
37 New York City recently eliminated the surgery requirement. See infra note 69.
38 Spade, supra note 13, at 769.
39 See Know Your Rights: Passports, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www.
transequality.org/know-your-rights/passports [https://perma.cc/Z8JU-AY5T] (“[A] transgender person
can obtain a passport reflecting his or her current gender by submitting a certification from a physician
confirming that he or she has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition.”); Know Your
Rights: Social Security, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www.transequality.org/knowyour-rights/social-security [https://perma.cc/BYA8-ZYAH] (“[A] transgender person can change their
gender on their Social Security records by submitting either government-issued documentation
reflecting a change, or a certification from a physician confirming that they have had appropriate
clinical treatment for gender transition.”).
40 See Spade, supra note 13, at 735 fig.1, app. at 822-41 (highlighting the wide discrepancies
among states regarding policies for changing one’s legal gender); Changing Birth Certificate Sex,
supra note 34 (same).
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recognized as female by homeless shelters and the DMV while her birth
certificate lists her as male. Regardless, if she is arrested, she is likely to be
placed in a single-sex, male facility (assuming she has not had genital surgery).
These discrepancies produce tangible effects. Prior to being estopped by a
federal judge, the Department of Homeland Security ordered employers to
fire employees who could not resolve discrepancies between their Social Security
Administration (SSA) records and their employer’s identity records.41 Until
recently, the SSA required proof of genital surgery before changing legal gender
on SSA documents42 while some states had no surgery requirements.43
Therefore, trans* people who successfully altered their legal gender based on
state rules, but had not undergone genital surgery to satisfy the SSA’s
regulations, would have lost their jobs under the Department of Homeland
Security’s order.
It is a common misunderstanding that all trans* people want or need genital
surgery,44 commonly referred to as “sex reassignment surgery.”45 This misconception
perpetuates the notion that genital surgery should be a requirement for legal
gender reclassification. In reality, trans* people have different “aims and desires
for their bodies,” and they express their gender identity accordingly.46 For many
trans* people, changing external gender signals such as hairstyle, clothing, and
accessories is sufficient; for others, masculinizing or feminizing hormone
therapy to change secondary sex characteristics like voice, facial hair, breast
tissue, and muscle mass is most appropriate.47
External markers of gender are the most important signals for shaping
how others observe gender. The fact that only a few people ever know about
another person’s genitals underscores the extent to which genital surgery
requirements are unreasonably intrusive. Nearly all people interact with
friends, strangers, colleagues, classmates, and family members without

41 Spade, supra note 13, at 732 & n.8 (citing Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d
999 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
42 See Sunnivie Brydum, Social Security Removes Surgical Requirement for Gender Marker Change,
ADVOCATE (June 14, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2013/06/14/soc
ial-security-removes-surgical-requirement-gender-marker-change [https://perma.cc/QG9U-9J7D];
(“The SSA removed its requirement that transgender people wanting to amend their gender on a
Social Security card provide proof of gender reassignment surgery.”).
43 See Spade, supra note 13, at 736 (noting that Colorado, New York and the District of Columbia do
not require surgery to change one’s legal gender on a driver’s license).
44 Id. at 754-55.
45 E.g., Lenny Bernstein, Here’s How Sex Reassignment Surgery Works, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/02/09/heres-how-sex-reassignment-surg
ery-works/ [https://perma.cc/9NJD-AMV5].
46 Spade, supra note 13, at 754.
47 Id. at 754-55.
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genitalia becoming relevant. As genitalia is largely irrelevant to daily
interactions, trans* people’s genital status should be irrelevant to the State.48
Legal gender reclassification policies show that while trans* people may
try to present their gender on their own accord, their identity and expression
are still constrained by legal gender. Although people tend to think of
themselves as “authors of [their] own lives,” trans* people, in many respects,
have little authority over their own official recorded identities.49 Instead, legal
documentation evinces “the power dynamics between the individual and the
state about the authorship of identity.”50 The rules governing gender identity
“appropriat[e] individual autonomy to define the self ” and attempt to create
and maintain identity, often without the assent of the individual.51
Government rejection of trans* people’s gender identity causes expressive
and dignitary harm. The State causes expressive harm by meaningfully
repudiating trans* people’s identities.52 It simultaneously engages in dignitary
harm through privacy invasion and the infliction of emotional distress.53 This
expressive and dignitary harm, while abhorrent on its own, is also fundamentally
linked to violence against the trans* community. The rejection of trans*
people’s self-defined gender identity is often a triggering point for violence
against trans* individuals—such as when a state official asks for identification,
finds that the trans* individual’s gender marker does not match their outward
appearance, and then proceeds to assault or harass them.54
Moreover, the consequences produced by the government’s repudiation of
trans* people’s identity correlates with and likely contributes to high rates of
depression and suicide—i.e., violence against oneself.55 A staggering 41% of
48 Some courts have disagreed with this logic. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d
1215, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination was
not triggered when an employer asked about a trans woman’s genitals and then fired her because her
answer did not match her gender expression).
49 See Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 361, 388-90 (2014) (summarizing
how birth certificates complicate transgender people’s ability to control their lives and identities).
50 Id. at 362.
51 Id. at 372.
52 Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363,
1385-86 (2000) (describing how expressivists view the actions of legal officials as “meaningful” and
capable of “express[ing] condemnation” and illustrating the point by discussing how state-sanctioned
segregation labeled black Americans as inferior).
53 For an overview of dignitary torts generally—as well as defamation, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically—see Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing
Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 65-67, 70 (2012).
54 Trans* people living with incongruent identification are often exposed to harassment,
assault, and police brutality. GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 154, 158.
55 See id. at 2 (noting that 41% of respondents in a transgender survey reported having contemplated
suicide and that the rate was higher for victims of assault and harassment). In one survey, suicide attempts
were reported by 63-78% of trans* people subjected to physical or sexual violence at school, 57-61% of those
harassed by law enforcement, 60-70% of those who have suffered physical or sexual violence by law
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trans* people have attempted suicide, and this rate elevates when state
officials such as teachers reject a trans* person’s identity.56 Notably, this
statistic cannot capture the emotional distress and harm that accompanies a
suicide attempt, or the lives of trans* people who have died by suicide. This
statistic does not record the lives of people like Leelah Alcorn who are not
alive to take a survey, but must still be remembered and counted.57 The human
toll of oppression is underrepresented and not fully expressed, even by such
horrifying statistics. The expressive and dignitary harm, and exposure to
discrimination, harassment, and violence that accompany legal gender
classification, are of the utmost concern for trans* people and those concerned
with human rights.
C. The Government’s Impermissible Appropriation of Identity
Defining one’s own identity is one of the most personal and individual
practices one can engage in; it is central to autonomy.58 But for trans* people, this
identity-defining process has been impermissibly appropriated by the State. The
State elevates “political or communal self-definition” above individual selfdefinition.59 This “republican vision” rejects the liberal conception of individual selfgovernment.60 Instead, the “self” in self-government is the political community.61
Justice Scalia exhibited this republican vision in his Obergefell dissent. By
declining to join the majority’s decision, which held that states must
recognize same-sex marriages,62 Scalia rejected the ability of individuals to
enforcement, and 69% of those who have experienced homelessness. ANN P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND.
FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION & THE WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER
AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2014).
56 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“[S]uicide attempt rates rose dramatically when
teachers were the reported perpetrators [of harassment and assault].”).
57 See J. Bryan Lowder, Listen to Leelah Alcorn’s Final Words, SLATE: OUTWARD (Dec. 31, 2014, 4:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/12/31/leelah_alcorn_transgender_teen_from_ohio_should_be_hon
ored_in_death.html [https://perma.cc/W4M7-BMTR] (publishing Alcorn’s suicide note, which stated,
“My death needs to mean something. My death needs to be counted in the number of transgender
people who commit suicide this year. I want someone to look at that number and say ‘that’s fucked
up’ and fix it.”); see also Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, How to Save Your Life: A Response to
Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/opinion/aresponse-to-leelah-alcorns-suicide-note.html [https://perma.cc/Y2DG-CK8G] (reacting to the death of
Leelah Alcorn and her suicide note).
58 See Appell, supra note 49, at 388-89 (“Those who are transgender face an original birth
certificate that documents their birth sex, but not their gender identity. It is difficult to imagine
anything much more personal and autonomous than defining one’s own identity.” (footnote omitted)).
59 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 761 (describing the “[r]epublican [c]ritique” of individualism).
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By republican and liberal, Rubenfeld refers to modes
of political thought, as opposed to American political parties.
61 Id.
62 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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define their own identity through marital relations with individuals of the
same gender. For Justice Scalia, the decision “robs the People of the most
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won
in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.”63 He
minimized the right to individual identity and elevated the community’s right
to control individuals; he submerged individual identity beneath the will of
the communal polity.64
For republicanism, individual identity is viewed as an assault on the
communal identity. Justice Alito’s Obergefell dissent argues that the legalization of
same-sex marriage will be used to vilify opponents of same-sex marriage and
vitiate their “rights of conscience.”65 According to Alito, “I assume that those who
cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their
homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as
bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.”66 Thus,
those who “cling to old beliefs” must have the power to compel how
individuals in same-sex relationships self-identify in order to bolster those
“old beliefs.”
For liberal individualism, the legalization of same-sex marriage allows
gays, lesbians, and bisexual people to define their identities through marriage
(and have their identities recognized by the State) while others can still
partake in different self-definition practices, like opposite-sex marriage or
remaining single. However, for republicanism, allowing states to define
marriage provides “a way for people with different beliefs to live together in
a single nation.”67 Instead of allowing individual self-government for matters
of individual identity, political communities (i.e., states) should engage in
communal rulemaking that narrows individual agency.
Similarly, rules regarding legal gender identity allow the State to
appropriate trans* people’s right to engage in individual self-determination.
Jurisdictions that deny or restrict trans* people’s right to define their legal

63 Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision
usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional
understanding of marriage.”).
64 Justice Scalia also exhibited this vision in Lawrence v. Texas, where he wrote, “[T]he Court
has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the
democratic rules of engagement are observed. Many Americans do not want persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as
teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.” 539
U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2643.
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gender (or opt out of legal gender) limit trans* people’s identity-making
autonomy in favor of communal definitions of gender and sex.
For example, a trans* woman born in Tennessee will always have a birth
certificate that labels her as “male,” regardless of the fact that she is a
woman.68 Until recently,69 a trans* woman born in New York City would have
a birth certificate that says “male” unless and until she underwent
vaginoplasty (i.e., creation of a vagina) regardless of whether she wanted this
surgery or could afford it.70 Even if she dressed in a feminine way, underwent
hormone therapy, and had other surgeries, her outward presentation as a
female or self-defined gender identity would not matter for legal gender
purposes. This is so despite the fact that almost everyone who would see her
legal documentation, such as police officers and liquor store cashiers, would
not interact with her genitalia.
For both of these women, the rules about whether she can change her legal
gender evince a communal and political conception about what it means to be
“male” or “female.” In Tennessee, being female means being born with a vagina;
until recently, in New York City, being female meant being born with a vagina
or having a vagina constructed through surgery. Either way, being a woman is
inextricably linked to having a vagina. This communal definition of “woman”
thus proscribes individual actors from defining themselves on their own accord.
Since the same trans* woman would qualify for a “female” driver’s license
in California, but be forced to retain a “male” license in Tennessee,71 gender
is not a universal or stable category. Although “male” and “female” identities
do not stand on their own—in the way that medieval cathedral walls do not
stand independently—these gender identity laws buttress normative sex and
gender conceptions. But trans* people and their bodies should not be used as
“symbolic-cultural site[s] upon which human societies inscript their moral
order”;72 rather, we should have more faith that trans* people can renegotiate
and define their own identities.

68
69

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
New York City now allows trans* people to change their legal gender without proof of surgery.
Curtis M. Wong, New York’s Transgender Residents Will Now Be Able to Change Birth Certificate Sex
Designation Without Surgery, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/12/08/new-york-transgender-birt_n_6290590.html [https://perma.cc/9ADJ-28LS].
70 Spade, supra note 13, at 769. The old rules specifically required vaginoplasty or phalloplasty
and were notable for delineating the specific surgeries that were required. See id. at 736
(distinguishing New York City’s formerly strict policies for changing legal gender on a birth
certificate from California’s requirement that an applicant show “he or she has undergone any of a
variety of gender confirmation surgeries”).
71 Id. at app. 822-28.
72 Cf. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA 84, 104 (2002) (positing that “societies inscript their moral order” upon women and
their bodies by regulating sexual reproduction and gendered presentation and arguing that we should
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However, individuals cannot engage in unbridled self-identification since
many types of identities cause harm to third parties or are legitimately
undesirable. For example, society has a legitimate desire to not protect the
identity of “murderers.”73 Society may not want to recognize an unrestricted
identity of “gun owner” that would prevent background checks or assault
rifles bans. Nonetheless, society must also prevent the majoritarian will from
denying people the right to identity.74 Unrestrained individualism and
republicanism thus present a choice between Scylla and Charybdis. But this
dichotomous choice is not inevitable, and the antitotalitarian principle
underlying the Constitution sails between the two: while the government can
restrict certain liberties, it cannot submerge the individual and affirmatively
compel individual identity and conformity.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM
A. The Constitution’s Antitotalitarian Principle in Substantive Due Process
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court posited that substantive due process
rights are those “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed.’”75 However, this formulation has hardly been uniformly
applied. In Lawrence, the Court held that same-sex intimacy is a liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,76 and in Obergefell, the Court held that the ability
to choose a partner in marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be restricted by

have “more faith in the capacity of ordinary political actors to renegotiate their own narratives of
identity and difference through multicultural encounters in a democratic civil society”).
73 Although laws compelling us to be “non-murderer[s]” do standardize us, operate on our
bodies, and impinge physical acts, they do not compel “a defined role or identity with substantial,
affirmative, institutionalized functions. And although a person can refrain from murder only by
refraining from certain physical actions, his body is in no affirmative way taken over or put to use.
Laws against murder foreclose an avenue; they do not harness us to a given seat and direct us down
a single, regulated road.” Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 See Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, Opinion, Justice Scalia’s Majoritarian Theocracy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/opinion/justice-scalias-majoritarian-theocracy
.html [https://perma.cc/FZ8K-WWHC] (arguing that Justice Scalia’s dissents in the Supreme Court’s
four major gay rights cases evince a “political idea [that] verges on a majoritarian theocracy”).
75 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
76 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention by the government.”).
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gender,77 even though homosexuality was criminalized at the country’s founding
and gays have been oppressed throughout American history.78
Lawrence noted that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”79
Obergefell declared that rights are not solely defined “by who exercised them
in the past”; otherwise, “new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”80
Rights “come not from ancient sources alone,” but “rise, too, from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty
that remains urgent in our own era.”81 Oftentimes, commentators focus on
what is being denied—e.g., the denial of abortion, same-sex marriage, or
contraception.82 But focusing on what the law prohibits does not reveal the
underlying principles of substantive due process.
When applying substantive due process rights, the Court has focused on
the affirmative or productive consequences of the law in question.83 In doing so,
the Court invalidates laws that allow the State to submerge the individual,
appropriate the individual’s means of identity-making, and affirmatively shape
the individual’s life.84 Substantive due process “is not the freedom to do certain,
particular acts determined to be fundamental through some ever-progressing
normative lens. It is the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally
determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”85 The antitotalitarian
principle is thus invoked to protect these fundamental rights.
Substantive due process rights, such as the freedom to not bear children,
protect against laws that have extensive affirmative effects on individual lives:

77 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (“The Court now holds that
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”).
78 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the nation’s history and
tradition of imposing criminal sanctions on “sodomy”).
79 Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
81 Id. at 2602; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (“[The drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment] knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (describing substantive due process and the
balance between liberty and the demands of organized society as “having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which [the country] developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
82 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783 (acknowledging that the “universal” method of privacy
analysis begins by asking what is being prohibited, but suggesting that we should focus not on “what
is being prohibited, but [on] what is being produced”).
83 Id. at 784.
84 Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (discussing the limits upon the
State’s ability to achieve desirable ends that affect the public).
85 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784.
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At the simplest, most quotidian level, such laws tend to take over the lives of
the persons involved: they occupy and preoccupy. They affirmatively and very
substantially shape a person’s life; they direct a life’s development along a
particular avenue. These laws do not simply proscribe one act or remove one
liberty; they inform the totality of a person’s life.86

Thus, the Constitution prohibits certain government actions that affirmatively
compel lives toward a government-determined end.
Roe v. Wade’s holding that the Constitution’s right to liberty encompasses
a woman’s decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy87 rejects the
affirmative effects of anti-abortion laws. Immediately after announcing its
holding, the Court explained that the “[t]he detriment that the State would
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice,” including
medically diagnosable harm, the psychological and physical taxation of
pregnancy, labor, and child-rearing, the distress associated with an unwanted
child, and the problem of bringing a child into a family that is unable to care
for it.88 Thus, Roe’s rationale did not focus on the denial of the right to
abortion inasmuch as it emphasized that anti-abortion laws affirmatively
compel the lives of women toward the path of “mother” and “caretaker.”
Anti-abortion laws had transformed the lives and identities of women
in far-reaching, consequential ways: they shaped their day-to-day actions,
radically altered financial statuses, changed occupations, career trajectories,
and preoccupations, and engendered—for many—the identity of “mother.”89
Therefore, “the decision whether to have a child [is protected] because
parenthood alters so dramatically an individual’s self-definition.”90 Anti-abortion
laws “drafted” women into the service of the State to produce a population through
compulsory pregnancy, labor, and, in most circumstances, childcare.91 Rubenfeld
explains, “The exertion of power over the body is in this respect comparable to the
exertion of power over a child’s mind: its effect can be formative, shaping identity
at a point where intellectual resistance cannot meet it.”92
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court affirmed a preliminary injunction
enjoining Oregon from requiring all children between the ages of eight and

86
87

Id.
See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“The right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
88 Id.
89 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 788-91 (describing the many ways in which “anti-abortion
laws exert power productively over a woman’s body” and “forcefully reshape and redirect her life”).
90 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) .
91 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 791.
92 Id. at 789.
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sixteen to attend public school through the eighth grade.93 By virtue of the
antitotalitarian principle recognized in Meyer, the State could not “standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”94
Moreover, the Court expressed concern about children being conscripted into
the State’s service, noting that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State” and that she has “additional obligations.”95 Together, Meyer and Pierce
show that the government cannot affirmatively compel citizens to conform to
its own desires.
The Lawrence Court evinced a realization that anti-sodomy laws affirmatively
fashioned gay people as criminals. Lawrence protected the liberty of “an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct” “from unwarranted government intrusions.”96 The laws
involved in Lawrence prohibited more than just a particular sexual act: they
sought to control personal relationships.97 Moreover, the criminalization of
same-sex intimacy—and, therefore, the criminalization of gay people who engage
in sexual intimacy—“‘legally sanction[ed] discrimination against [homosexuals]
in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,’ including in the areas of
‘employment, family issues, and housing.’”98
The Court has also invoked antitotalitarianism to protect an individual’s
right to choose a spouse of his or her choice. In Loving v. Virginia, 99 the Court
discarded interracial marriage bans instituted to segregate racial communities,
delegitimize relations among racial groups, and—from an abhorrent eugenics
perspective—produce “untainted”100 blood. The right to choose a spouse
“resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”101
Therefore, the State may not restrict a person’s choice of spouse to enforce
racism, segregation, and eugenics.
Likewise, Obergefell reflected a similar concern regarding the affirmative
effects of restrictions on marriage. The Court’s opinion opens by proclaiming
that “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to

93
94
95
96
97

268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925).
Id. at 534-35 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
Id. at 535.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
See id. at 567 (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals.”).
98 Id. at 581-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Morales,
826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992), rev’d, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994)).
99 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
100 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 791-92.
101 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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define and express their identity.”102 The Court went on to observe that “the right
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.”103 Thus, “the decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s
momentous acts of self-definition.”104 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
expressed concern for individuals excluded from the right to marry because
of their partner’s gender: “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a
lonely person might call out only to find no one there.”105 Marriage safeguards
children and families by conferring legal recognition and structure, over a
thousand marital benefits, and respect.106 Ultimately, Obergefell expressed
concern with how the State’s marriage restrictions appropriated the means of
self-definition and the resultant production of loneliness, harm to children
and families of same-sex couples, and exposure of same-sex families to undue
legal, medical, economic, and personal risk.
B. The Constitution’s Antitotalitarianism in First Amendment Jurisprudence
The core of the First Amendment is “the right not to be compelled to
make a false affirmation of one’s identity, ideas or beliefs,”107 and this core
evinces the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism. The First
Amendment protects individuals from affirmative, government-compelled
speech that vitiates their ability to speak, believe, and think independently.
The seminal First Amendment case West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette struck down compulsory flag salutes and pledges in schools.108 The
Court held that where the freedom asserted does not “colli[de] with rights
asserted by any other individual,”109 “censorship or suppression of expression
is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish.”110 The First Amendment’s paramount concern is the freedom of
identity, ideas, and beliefs, and only a “clear and present danger” can override
this concern.111 Barnette explained that these antitotalitarian principles
developed on the same soil that produced a laissez-faire “philosophy that the
102
103
104
105
106
107

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2599.
Id.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2600-01.
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1997).
108 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
109 Id. at 630. In situations where the freedom asserted collides with the rights asserted by
another, the State may determine where the rights of one end and another begin. Id.
110 Id. at 633.
111 Id.
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individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through
the absence of governmental restraints.”112 Today, given the increasing
integration of society and expanded government, the First Amendment needs
to proscribe affirmative government compulsion, even regarding extreme
dissent or disagreement:
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.113

Thus, even ideas, identities, or beliefs that strike at the core of the existing
order are protected by our antitotalitarian Constitution.
Wooley v. Maynard114 reiterated Barnette’s proscription against compelled
speech and totalitarian government. Mr. and Mrs. Maynard were Jehovah’s
Witnesses who viewed New Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto, which
was embossed on all license plates, as repugnant to their moral, religious, and
political beliefs.115 New Hampshire compelled Mr. and Mrs. Maynard to
display a “mobile billboard” that affronted their identity.116 By refusing to
allow them to cover the motto, the State infringed upon the Maynards’s “right
to refrain from speaking” that, along with “the right to speak,” is part of the
“broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”117 The Court explained,
“The First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to hold a point of
view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find
morally objectionable.”118
Ultimately, the First Amendment prevents the State from assuming
control of individual identity, ideas, and beliefs—including the offensive,
different, or contrarian: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”119
The Constitution does not exist to reify and ossify the current order; rather,
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 639.
Id. at 642.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
Id. at 715.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). The Court ultimately held that Texas may not
criminally prosecute a flag-burning protester despite the state’s interest in preserving the flag as a
symbol of national unity. Id. at 420.
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it affords citizens the right to define themselves with respect to matters of
personhood and identity.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TOTALITARIANISM
DIRECTED AT TRANS* PEOPLE
A. Compulsory Gender Identity Is Impermissible Totalitarianism
The Constitution’s protection of the rights to privacy, identity, speech,
belief, and life-determining decisions serves as a bulwark against a totalitarian
attempt to submerge the individual beneath the State. Therefore, “[t]he
danger . . . is a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed
occupation of individuals’ lives . . . [:] a society standardized and normalized,
in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly directed.”120 This fear of
state power has led to substantive due process rights regarding child-rearing,
bodily autonomy regarding abortions, choice in marriage and sexual intimacy,
and First Amendment proscriptions on compelled speech. This antitotalitarian
principle must also extend to the right to self-define one’s gender identity.
1. Compulsory Gender Identity Impermissibly Appropriates
Individual Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Definition
The danger of a totalitarianism that appropriates individual autonomy
and affirmatively compels people along particular avenues is realized when
the State controls trans* people’s identity. As Meyer121 and Pierce122 indicate,
the State cannot affirmatively shape citizens to fit its own normative desires.
Trans* people are not “creature[s] of the State”;123 they are individuals with a
right to identity.
Just as the criminalization of same-sex intimacy in Lawrence sanctioned
discrimination against gay people in both government and nongovernment
settings,124 the State’s denial of gender identity sanctions the oppression of
trans* people. With incongruent legal documents, trans* people are at an increased
risk of unemployment, harassment, violence,125 and placement in inappropriate

120
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Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784.
See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
Cf. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting that a child is not a “mere
creature of the State”).
124 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
125 GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 153-155; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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sex-segregated facilities. Through administrative gender documentation, these
laws affirmatively shape the opportunities and security of trans* people.126
Moreover, state restrictions on gender reclassification deny individual
autonomy and self-definition. Like choosing one’s spouse, which Obergefell
describes as an identity-defining act,127 representing one’s gender is inherently
identity-defining. Gender defines and shapes our interactions: gender affects the
pronouns we use to refer to individuals and the way in which we treat them.
Thus, gender, even more so than marital status, is a central point around
which identity and interpersonal interactions are ordered. Compulsory
gender identity thus “do[es] not simply proscribe one act or remove one
liberty; [it] inform[s] the totality of a person’s life.”128
2. Compulsory Gender Identity Violates the First Amendment
Right to Freedom From Compelled Speech
Compelling trans* people to identify themselves by their assigned legal
gender is repugnant to the First Amendment. Together, Barnette129 and
Wooley130 delineate two axes by which to evaluate the burden imposed by
compelled affirmation: “[1] the degree of linkage (or attenuation) that exists
between the message and the speaker; and [2] the opportunity available to
the speaker to make clear to others her disagreement with the message she is
forced to propound.”131 In Barnette, the compelled flag salute was immediate,
personal, and required verbal action and a physical salute; however, the students
could note their involuntary participation to classmates and teachers.132 Thus,
the weight of the burden in Barnette fell on the degree of linkage axis.133 In
Wooley, the link between the Maynards and the compelled affirmation on their
license plate was less personal and more attenuated: the Maynards were not
required to speak the state’s motto but were required to display it on their
126 See Spade, supra note 13, at 747 (“The ubiquity of the assumption that gender classification is
a proper category of administrative governance, combined with the economic and political impairment
that results from being improperly classified, allows us to analyze disparities in life chances across
administratively constructed populations. This provides a way of thinking about inequality and
oppression outside of individualizing discrimination frameworks and instead through a biopolitical
understanding of the management of populations and the distribution of life chances.”).
127 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599 (2015) (finding that marriage is a
fundamental right and noting that that the “liberties [protected by the Constitution] extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that
define personal identity and beliefs”).
128 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784 (discussing totalitarianism in the anti-abortion and
“anti-miscegenation” law context).
129 See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
131 Wolff, supra note 107, at 1200.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1200-01.
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property.134 However, the Maynards did not have an ample opportunity to
communicate their disagreement with fellow motorists or pedestrians who
viewed their license plate; thus, the weight of the burden fell on the latter axis.135
Trans* people are burdened by both axes: they are compelled to affirm a
message that is inherently opposed to their identity, and their ability to
communicate their disagreement with that compelled affirmation is vitiated
by legal gender. When Alexandra Glover attempted to change her driver’s
license photo and the OMV employee asked what gender she was listed as,
Alexandra was effectively compelled to say “male” because of her legal gender.136
When trans* people are not allowed to record their true identities on legal
documents (or opt out of legal gender altogether), they are compelled to
affirmatively identify with a gender that is contrary to their core identity.
Moreover, the government’s imposition and maintenance of legal gender
supersedes trans* people’s ability to effectively communicate their disagreement
with this policy. Although trans* people can change how others view and
understand them through hairstyle, makeup, hormone treatment, surgeries,
and outward gender presentation, state actors and private actors can use legal
gender to abrogate these efforts.137 The Louisiana OMV employee denied
Alexandra Glover’s ability to express her disagreement with her legal gender
by saying, “You can’t present as a woman if you’re listed as a man . . . . If you
have makeup on or anything like that you’re supposed to take all that off,
because you are actually a man.”138 Similarly, Ann Sweeney’s prison doctor told
her, “You were born a boy, and you’re going to stay a boy” before discontinuing
her hormone treatments.139
The very existence of legal gender provided these state actors with
ammunition to vitiate trans* people’s ability to communicate their own gender
and express disagreement with gender identity policies. Thus, legal gender
implicates both axes of the Barnette–Wooley compelled affirmation jurisprudence.
***
The government occupies the lives of trans* people by defining gender
without their consent. While not as visibly affirmative as Sparta’s communal
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Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
By refusing to recognize trans* people’s gender identities, the State enables ordinary
citizens and government officials to reject their identities. As “law can have a causal effect on the
development, enforcement, internalization, and reinforcement of norms,” FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THE FORCE OF LAW 145 (2015), requirements that trans* people are labeled as their assigned birth
sex reinforce a misunderstanding that trans* people cannot self-identify their gender.
138 Lau, supra note 25 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Rosenblum, supra note 30 at 500-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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child-rearing indoctrination program,140 the State’s legal gender system seeks
to compel trans* people to maintain their legal gender identity or, in some
jurisdictions, conform to the “opposite sex” entirely through invasive genital
surgery requirements.141 The State, in many ways, seeks to compel homogeneity
among “men” and among “women” without allowing for much variation in how
trans* people express themselves as male, female, genderqueer,142 gender X,143
etc. The State uses trans* bodies to buttress normative conceptions of sex and
submerges trans* people beneath the State for this purpose.
B. Affording Trans* People Limited Agency Within a Restrictive Legal Gender
Matrix Does Not Eliminate Unconstitutional Totalitarianism
Merely allowing some trans* people to reclassify their gender—and restricting
such opportunities through onerous requirements—does not ameliorate the
government’s unconstitutional actions. These schemes still impose gender identity
and evince totalitarian control over trans* people’s lives. Moreover, the
Constitution forbids coercive conditions on exercising constitutional rights.
First, the government does not allow trans* people to opt out of the
gender system. No jurisdiction in the United States allows individuals to
officially identify as “genderqueer” or “Gender X”; one cannot have a driver’s
license or birth certificate without a gender marker of “male” or “female.”
Thus, Michel Foucault’s view that laws can “interject[] us in a network of
norms” aptly captures the experience of trans* people in the United States
today.144 Both trans* people and nontrans* people cannot escape this network.
Second, the government’s very act of imposing gender is totalitarianism.
Imposing identity is not a legitimate domain of governance. The government
does not, for instance, label babies born to Catholics as “Catholic” and wed them
to that identity unless they undergo financially burdensome, time-consuming,
and potentially unwanted, painful procedures. The government does record some
information relevant to identity, like political party affiliation and marital status,
but this kind of information is directly related to government practices like

140
141
142

See supra text accompanying note 7.
See supra notes 26, 38, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, A University Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-third
-gender-neutral.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8FL2-D4PJ] (reporting on the University of Vermont’s
recognition of the genderqueer identity as a third gender, distinct from both male and female).
143 See Matt Dathan, Gender Neutral Passports Move a Step Closer to Reality After Labour Backing,
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gender-neutralpassports-move-a-step-closer-to-reality-10123734.html [https://perma.cc/3CBM-3YJB] (explaining
that the United Kingdom is considering introducing “Gender X” passports for people who identify
as neither male nor female (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783.
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voting in primary elections and determining tax benefits, and these identities
can be changed if and when individuals desire to do so.
Third, the government cannot impose impermissible, coercive conditions
that affect access to constitutional rights. The “unconstitutional conditions
doctrine . . . guards against a characteristic form of government overreaching and
thus serves a state-checking function.”145 It preserves “spheres of private ordering
from government domination” and ensures that citizens receive equal treatment
from the government,146 bolstering the Constitution’s proscription against
totalitarianism. Examples of “unconstitutional conditions” include requiring
veterans to swear loyalty to the government before receiving a veterans’
property-tax exemption147 and denying state unemployment benefits to a religious
woman who remained unemployed because she would not work on the Sabbath.148
Forcing citizens to choose between accepting government benefits (or
escaping harm) and exercising constitutional rights equates to a denial of
those rights. Thus, in Sherbert, the Court found that a state may not condition
the receipt of unemployment benefits on a willingness to accept employment
that conflicts with one’s religious practices:
[T]he pressure upon [the claimant] to forego [her religious] practice is
unmistakable. The ruling [below] forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
appellant for her Saturday worship.149

Thus, the government does not need to directly target constitutional rights
to violate them; restricting access to constitutional rights with unacceptable
conditions is also a violation of those rights.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine highlights the Constitution’s
proscription against totalitarianism. These kinds of conditions alter the balance
of power between the government and individuals and diminish the individual’s
ability to maintain self-governing autonomy.150 They also “skew the distribution
of constitutional rights among rightholders”;151 those who comply with the
145
146
147

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1506 (1989).
Id.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (noting that “the denial of a tax exemption
for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain
from the proscribed speech,” thereby violating their free speech rights).
148 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963).
149 Id. at 404.
150 Sullivan, supra note 145, at 1490.
151 Id.
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unconstitutional condition have greater rights than those who do not. Additionally,
when these conditions affect those who depend on government assistance or
benefits, they “create an undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of
constitutional rights.”152 Those who depend on government assistance like food
stamps and veteran’s benefits are disproportionately affected and thus retain fewer
rights than those free from such coercion.
The gender rule matrix153 constitutes an unconstitutional condition. It forces
trans* people to choose between their bodily autonomy (i.e., avoiding unwanted
surgeries or medical interventions) and their right to identity (i.e., self-defining
their legal gender). One’s constitutional right to identity cannot be subject to such
an egregious condition, nor can one’s right to bodily autonomy. This forced choice
is particularly important because the ability to define one’s legal gender—and
obtain appropriate legal documents—is fundamental to basic tasks such as
obtaining employment, securing housing, and traveling.
Moreover, similar to many other unconstitutional conditions, the gender
rule matrix skews rights among the population. It restricts trans* people’s
ability to define their own identity based on a myriad of federal, state, and
administrative rules—and thus distributes more rights to those who live in
more progressive jurisdictions with more permissive gender identity laws and
those who want and can afford gender-confirmation surgery. Additionally,
restrictive gender classification rules particularly affect low-income trans*
people who disproportionately rely on government services, interact with the
police, are incarcerated, and are less likely to have employment options with
nondiscriminatory employers.
By preventing trans* people from self-defining their gender or opting out
of the gender system, the government affirmatively produces identity. The
State compels “male” or “female” identity when doing so is contrary to the
person’s self-conception. The right to identity resides with the individual; the
State cannot conscript people’s bodies into its service by placing them in
Spartan barracks,154 forcing them to bear children,155 compelling affirmations,156
criminalizing their sexual identity157—or by conditioning privileges on renouncing
one’s freedom from such coercion.158 The Constitution’s antitotalitarian principle
prohibits state interjection into identity-formation. Forcing trans* people to be
marked as their assigned gender is totalitarianism. Defining gender is at the
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Id.
See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
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core of autonomy: individuals must be able to choose their identity or opt out
of the gender system. Otherwise, they are submerged beneath the State.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES TO ELIMINATE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
A. The Government Must Eliminate or Limit the Use of Legal Gender
The government may desire some system of legal gender. However,
several considerations caution against the overuse of gender markers and
government imposition of gender. First, one’s assigned gender at birth may
not be an appropriate label. For example, the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) identify trans* women as “men who have sex with men.”159 But a
trans* woman is not a man and she may or may not have sex with men. As a
result of this misclassification, there is no nationwide information about the
HIV rate within this community, which is likely to be extraordinarily high.160
The CDC’s definition, which uses one’s gender assigned at birth, is
fundamentally problematic and impedes research on the HIV epidemic
within the trans* community.
Second, legal gender on documents may not be very useful for personal
identification. One’s outward expression, documented on a photograph, is more
effective than an “M” or “F” gender marker. Consider that while some states once
included race on driver’s licenses, this is no longer considered necessary for
identification purposes.161 Moreover, the government can accurately identify
people without gender markers. The Social Security Administration, for
instance, effectively documents the lives, disability status, marital status, and
employment status of Americans with a nine-digit number that does not reflect
gender.162 Thus, whenever the government considers using gender markers, it
should consider whether doing so is necessary, useful or efficient.
Moreover, the government should not impose gender identity at birth. All
people—trans* and nontrans*—should identify or record their gender at a later
time. Germany, for instance, allows parents of intersex children (i.e., children
born with physically indeterminate gender characteristics) to record “X” instead
159 Spade, supra note 13, at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Email from Carrie
Davis, Coordinator, Gender Identity Project, to Dean Spade (June 11, 2007)).
160 Id.; see also GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 80-81 (noting that 2.64% of trans respondents
reported HIV infection, over four times the national average of 0.6%, and that 24.90% of black trans
respondents reported HIV infection, over forty-one times the national average).
161 Spade, supra note 13, at 805.
162 The Social Security Administration documents gender. It does not, however, mark legal
gender through the Social Security number or on the Social Security card. Social Security numbers
are generated without respect to gender; merely viewing a Social Security number alone does not
reveal gender. Social Security Number Randomization, SOC. SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/empl
oyer/randomization.html [https://perma.cc/NPV4-84KY].
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of “male” or “female” on birth certificates.163 These children are not expected to
remain “Gender X” forever but are expected to choose the “male” or “female”
identity at some point in the future.164 Our government could allow all children
to select a gender when they are ready or even permit them to remain “Gender
X.” For trans* people, imposing an incorrect gender identity will increase the
long-term risk of depression, ostracism, intense discrimination, and suicide.165
Therefore, the convenience of marking all children as “male” or “female” at birth
is simply not worth the disproportionate and devastating consequences imposed
on the approximately one million trans* people in the United States.166
Moreover, there are few circumstances in which the government actually
needs to know one’s gender.167 Gender is irrelevant to the provision of most
government services. Sex-segregated prison facilities168 and the Selective
Service System169 are among the few areas where the government posits that
it cannot relate to individuals on a gender-neutral basis.170 And if the
government must keep these systems strictly organized by gender, it could
adopt a rule for them that does not vitiate the agency of trans* people.

163 Jacinta Nandi, Opinion, Germany Got It Right by Offering a Third Gender Option on Birth
Certificates, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/20
13/nov/10/germany-third-gender-birth-certificate [https://perma.cc/M8Y9-ASVR].
164 Id.
165 See supra notes 24, 55–56 and accompanying text.
166 See Claire Cain Miller, The Search for the Best Estimate of the Transgender Population, N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/upshot/the-search-for-the-best-estimate
-of-the-transgender-population.html [https://perma.cc/2X3X-YVXZ] (reporting that approximately
700,000 American adults identify as trans (citing GARY J. GATES, THE WIILIAMS INST., HOW
MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 6 (2011))). The actual
number of trans* people in the United States is likely higher since many children are trans*. See
Christin Scarlett Milloy, Don’t Let the Doctor Do This to Your Newborn, SLATE: OUTWARD (June 26,
2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/06/26/infant_gender_assignment_unn
ecessary_and_potentially_harmful.html [https://perma.cc/796B-PH82] (explaining that imposing
legal gender on an infant entails a 1-2% risk of harming the child since 1-2% of infants will ultimately
identify as trans).
167 See Spade, supra note 13, at 814-16 (suggesting that gender tracking might be helpful on the
institutional level with respect to initiatives like maintaining public health data and information
about affirmative action programs).
168 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
169 The Selective Service System requires all men ages eighteen to twenty-five to register for
the draft. Who Must Register, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Registration-Info/WhoRegistration [https://perma.cc/7NWM-PE27] [hereinafter Who Must Register]. Congress has yet to
require women to register with the Selective Service. Women and the Draft, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS.,
https://www.sss.gov/Registration/Women-And-Draft [https://perma.cc/7SFB-5Y8K]. With regard
to trans* people, the Selective Service System requires transgender women to register for the draft,
but does not require transgender men to register. Who Must Register, supra.
170 Issues concerning exclusive use of sex-segregated prison facilities and the male-only draft
are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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B. The Government Must Respect Self-Determined and Self-Expressed Identity
Regardless, even if the government documents gender, the right of trans*
people to self-define their gender identity is protected by the Constitution.
First, self-identification is already an appropriate means of defining
individual identity, even when government recognition is involved. For
example, an individual’s response to the race question on the United States
Census is entirely self-determined.171 A return to nineteenth century “racial
determination trials”—that determined whether individuals were black or
white for the purpose of determining whether they were slaves—would be
impermissible.172 The government recognizes that affirmatively producing
racial identity is not a legitimate act.
The government also does not rigidly define sexual orientation. Obergefell
permits gays and lesbians to marry same-sex partners because their
“immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to
this profound commitment.”173 But the Court does not require individuals to
be only same-sex oriented before they can marry same-sex partners.174 A
bisexual man can marry a man. In fact, a straight man can marry a man. The
Court thus allows people to self-define through marriage, but does not
impose intrusive requirements regarding sexual orientation.175
States already recognize certain identity-based claims, like adverse
possession and common law marriage, based on self-declaration and outward
presentation (i.e., a “performance” of identity).176 To adversely possess property,
one must live on land in a manner that courts presume an owner would.177 The
acts cannot be “isolated or infrequent—continual, ritualized repetition is
required.”178 Similarly, some states recognize common law marriages when
individuals hold themselves out as married. Rhode Island, for example,
recognizes common law marriages when the parties seriously intended to
enter into a marital relationship and their conduct leads the community to

171 Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html
[https://perma.cc/BXZ6-HH5H] (last updated July 8, 2013).
172 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 900-01 (2002) (discussing racial determination trials).
173 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
174 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
175 Many individuals are neither exclusively opposite-sex nor same-sex oriented. See Kenji
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 380-81 (2000) (discussing
the Kinsey scale, which conceptualizes sexual orientation as a continuum).
176 Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional Practice, 84 OR.
L. REV. 563, 613-16 (2005).
177 Id. at 614.
178 Id.
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view them as married.179 The intent and belief elements “are demonstrated by
‘inference from cohabitation, declarations, reputation [among the community], and
other competent circumstantial evidence.’”180
If the government must, in compelling circumstances, interact with a
citizen based on gender, it could determine gender through proclaimed
identity and the “adverse possession” of gender.181 For instance, if the
individual presents as female in regular, everyday life, she should be regarded
as female. This would eliminate any risk that a male might claim to be a
woman merely to avoid the draft or placement in a male prison facility. Of
course, this determination should defer to the individual’s identity, recognize
the multiplicity of gender identities, and should not be used to produce and
ossify male or female gender norms.
In these frameworks of identity, individuals claim a status by personal
declaration and “hold[ing] her or himself out to the community” as an owner
or spouse.182 After all, “these labels are fundamentally about communication
to the public at large.”183 Gender identity is another identity characteristic,
like owner or spouse, which can be determined by individual proclamation
and public presentation. This analogy does not propose that trans* people
should have to wait years to obtain “adverse possession” or “common law”
identity. Rather, the comparison to common law marriages and adverse
possession proves that there are legal avenues to control one’s own identity
and status—and obtain government recognition—without navigating intrusive
and demeaning legal requirements.
Moreover, the government’s respect for self-proclaimed religious beliefs,
although not entirely analogous given First Amendment religious protections, is
still informative here. When a claimant for religious liberty comes before a
court, the government defers to and respects her religious identity. Under the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,184
a factfinder can evaluate whether a religious practice is sincere, but may not

179 Smith v. Smith, 966 A.2d 109, 114 (R.I. 2009) (citing Sardonis v. Sardonis, 261 A.2d 22, 24
(R.I. 1970)); see also Lewis v. Anderson, 173 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App. 2005) (describing Texas’s
requirements for recognizing a common law marriage).
180 Smith, 966 A.2d at 114 (citing Sardonis, 261 A.2d at 24).
181 See Clarke, supra note 176, at 592 (“[O]ne could imagine a doctor determining sex based on . . .
whether the claimant held out a consistent gendered image to the community on a continuous basis,
whether or not the community accepted that image, and whether or not the claimant executed the legal
formalities deemed appropriate to his or her purported sex.”).
182 Id. at 614.
183 Id.
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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inquire into the truthfulness of religious beliefs.185 The First Amendment
both “forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship” and “safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion”—even those that are “rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths.”186 Additionally, since an inquiry into the sincerity of a
person’s religious beliefs is “purely a subjective question”187 and inherently
speculative, such inquiries are “handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial
shyness.’”188 In practice, “[s]incerity is generally presumed or easily established”
based on the words or actions of the claimant.189 The government should defer
to people’s sincerely held gender identities—and not investigate or govern
them—in the same way that it defers to the truthfulness or reasonableness of
sincerely held religious beliefs.
Furthermore, courts afford religious claimants protection for their
sincerely held beliefs despite inconsistent behavior190 and even if “a person
does not adhere steadfastly to every tenet of his faith.”191 Thus, the
government should not impose gender markers upon individuals and deny
them the ability to reclassify their gender or opt out of gender altogether.
Similarly, the government should not require complete adherence to the
normative biological traits of another gender as a condition for gender
reclassification. The government does not require the religious beliefs of
claimants to adhere to strict orthodoxy or catechism; trans* people should
similarly be able to define their identity consistent with their own understanding
of gender, not a normative prescription of gender.
Finally, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court accepted the
legitimacy of the petitioners’ claimed religious objection to an insurance mandate
185 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“[W]e do not agree that the truth or
verity of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury.”).
186 Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940)).
187 Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955).
188 Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 2012)); see also
Andrew Karp, “A Sincerely Held Sexual Belief ”: What LGBT Refugee and Asylum Law Can Learn From
Free Exercise Claims and Post-DOMA Immigration Benefits for Same-Sex Couples, 14 DUKEMINIER
AWARDS: BEST SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY L. REV. ARTICLES, 2015, at 1, 16-18
(“Insofar as sexuality and religion are highly subjective concepts, difficult to prove by way of
objective evidence, it also makes sense that courts analyze similarly whether an individual’s sexual
identity or religious beliefs are entitled to legal protection.”).
189 Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 791.
190 Karp, supra note 188, at 17 (“A finding of sincerity does not require perfect adherence to [an
individual’s] beliefs . . . , and even the most sincere practitioner may stray from time to time. ‘[A]
sincere religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights because he is not scrupulous in his
observance . . . .’” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moussazadeh,
703 F.3d at 791-92)).
191 Id. at 17 n.122 (quoting Reed v. Faulker, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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that required companies to provide employees with coverage for contraceptives:
“[I]t is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line
drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”192 Trans* people could also benefit from a
rule under which sincerely held gender identities of “honest conviction” are
recognized by the government, regardless of whether government officials
believe those gender identities are “correct.” Ultimately, gender identity, like
religious identity, must remain with the individual to define and express.
The deference to religious claimants stands in stark contrast to the lack of
deference shown to trans* claimants. For example, trans woman Janet Heilig
Wright was denied the right to change her legal gender despite letters from her
social worker and doctor affirming her female identity, hormone treatment
regimen, and hormonal castration.193 The court was unsatisfied with Janet’s claim
and referred to this “factual evidence” as “rather skimpy.”194 The State would not
change her legal gender unless she underwent irreversible genital surgery.195
Moreover, the court continued to use masculine pronouns to refer to Janet,
explaining, “We do so not to disparage petitioner’s undoubtedly sincere belief
that his transition is, indeed, complete, but simply to be consistent with our
conclusion that he has yet to offer sufficient evidence to warrant that
determination as a legal manner.”196
The judicial branch also disparaged the gender identity of trans woman
Ashley Diamond, who was placed in a male prison facility only to be denied
medical treatment and repeatedly sexually assaulted.197 In the first line of the
opinion dismissing the defendants’ motions to dismiss her claims, the court
noted, “Plaintiff Ashley Diamond alleges she is a transgender woman.”198
Thus, Ashley’s gender identity was apparently only “allege[d].” Moreover, in
a footnote accompanying “she,” the court explained, “All parties refer to
Diamond with feminine pronouns. Consequently, the Court does the same.
This should suggest nothing other than consistency.”199 In doing so, the judge
vitiated Ashley’s right to identity despite the clear support in the record that
Ashley had “strongly identified” as female since childhood, expressed herself

192 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
193 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 70-71 (Md. 2003).
194 Id. at 70.
195 See id. at 87 (noting that—on remand—Janet had the burden to present sufficient evidence
of having “completed a permanent and irreversible change from male to female”).
196 Id. at 70-71 n.1 (emphasis added).
197 Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1353-58 (M.D. Ga. 2015).
198 Id. at 1353 (footnote omitted).
199 Id. at 1353 n.1.
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as female for years, and received feminizing hormone treatment for over
seventeen years.200
Finally, the Supreme Court’s description of George and Maxine Maynard
in Wooley v. Maynard201 evinces the disparity between judicial deference to
religious identity and judicial scrutiny of gender identity. The first time the
Maynards are mentioned, Chief Justice Berger, writing for the Court, noted,
“Appellees George Maynard and his wife Maxine are followers of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses faith.”202 They did not merely allege to be Jehovah’s
Witnesses. Similarly, the Court did not refer to them as Jehovah’s Witnesses
only to maintain consistency with the parties’ opinions of the Maynards’s
faith. Instead, the Court accepted their sincerely held religious identity as
proclaimed. Likewise, courts must accept the sincerely held gender identities
proclaimed by trans* people.
As a start, maybe trans* people should cover the gender on their legal
documents with tape like George and Maxine Maynard covered “Live Free
or Die” on their license plate.203 If the United States Constitution forbids the
government from forcing George and Maxine to display a state motto that
conflicts with their sincerely held beliefs, then it should forbid the government
from forcing trans* people to display gender markers on their driver’s licenses
that conflict with their sincerely held beliefs.
CONCLUSION
The government should not impose gender markers on legal documents,
inspect the veracity of trans* people’s gender identity, or condition changes
of legal identity on invasive surgery requirements. These acts impermissibly
occupy the lives of trans* people and compel identity. Restrictions or bans on
gender reclassification do not simply constrain one liberty or remove one
freedom; instead, they place unconstitutional conditions on the right to
identity, affirmatively affect trans* people’s life chances, use trans* people’s
bodies to buttress normative gender conceptions, and deny trans* people’s
sincerely held identities.
The imposition of gender identity inverts the typical constitutional
relationship between the individual and the State. Under the Constitution, the
individual self-regulates and self-governs regarding matters of personhood and
identity, and the State restricts or regulates particular liberties to promote
ordered liberty and justice. But the imposition of gender identity posits the State
as having full control over the individual’s body, life, and identity. The government
200
201
202
203

Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
Id. at 707-08 & n.4.
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and its rule matrix do not provide ordered liberty or justice for trans* people; the
government actually denies trans* people their constitutional right to identity.
Ultimately, the Constitution proscribes totalitarianism. The State cannot
enforce or compel identity, appropriate or conscript people into the service
of the State’s normative, ideological goals, or restrict one’s ability to engage
in essential, self-defining acts. Any such restriction “do[es] violence to both
letter and spirit of the Constitution.”204 For trans* people and the Constitution
alike, we must eliminate totalitarian gender identity laws.
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).

